[OpenAFS] home on afs woes
Russ Allbery
rra@stanford.edu
Wed, 04 Jan 2006 15:29:57 -0800
Jeffrey Hutzelman <jhutz@cmu.edu> writes:
> Russ Allbery <rra@stanford.edu> wrote:
>> The screen savers that I've looked at actually explicitly don't call
>> the account stack (or call it and ignore its return status) because
>> they don't want to lock out users with expired accounts.
>>
>> Don't ask me; I don't write the applications, I just try to hack PAM
>> modules to work with them.
> This is the right behavior. pam_acct_mgmt() is about "account
> management", not all-purpose authorization checks. In particular, it is
> about deciding whether this account is allowed to log in at all, not
> about whether a particular authenticated entity is allowed to access
> that account. Such decisions are _expected_ to be made in
> pam_authenticate.
Ah, okay, that's good to know. That makes me think that the current
Debian pam_krb5 implementation is correct here, and more correct than the
previous version.
> Well, they shouldn't call pam_open_session, because they're not opening
> a new session.
D'oh. Yes, of course.
> There is an appropriate opcode to use with pam_setcred for this, and I
> agree that applications that fail to do so are buggy. About all we can
> do about it is submit patches and hope they clean up their act.
I've submitted a Debian bug against xlockmore, at least. (And against
xdm, which calls pam_setcred multiple times and discards the environment
settings the last time it's called. And against OpenSSH, which calls
pam_authenticate in a child process and doesn't preserve any pam_data
across to the pam_setcred function.)
--
Russ Allbery (rra@stanford.edu) <http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/>