[OpenAFS] home on afs woes

Russ Allbery rra@stanford.edu
Wed, 04 Jan 2006 15:29:57 -0800


Jeffrey Hutzelman <jhutz@cmu.edu> writes:
> Russ Allbery <rra@stanford.edu> wrote:

>> The screen savers that I've looked at actually explicitly don't call
>> the account stack (or call it and ignore its return status) because
>> they don't want to lock out users with expired accounts.
>> 
>> Don't ask me; I don't write the applications, I just try to hack PAM
>> modules to work with them.

> This is the right behavior.  pam_acct_mgmt() is about "account
> management", not all-purpose authorization checks.  In particular, it is
> about deciding whether this account is allowed to log in at all, not
> about whether a particular authenticated entity is allowed to access
> that account.  Such decisions are _expected_ to be made in
> pam_authenticate.

Ah, okay, that's good to know.  That makes me think that the current
Debian pam_krb5 implementation is correct here, and more correct than the
previous version.

> Well, they shouldn't call pam_open_session, because they're not opening
> a new session.

D'oh.  Yes, of course.

> There is an appropriate opcode to use with pam_setcred for this, and I
> agree that applications that fail to do so are buggy.  About all we can
> do about it is submit patches and hope they clean up their act.

I've submitted a Debian bug against xlockmore, at least.  (And against
xdm, which calls pam_setcred multiple times and discards the environment
settings the last time it's called.  And against OpenSSH, which calls
pam_authenticate in a child process and doesn't preserve any pam_data
across to the pam_setcred function.)

-- 
Russ Allbery (rra@stanford.edu)             <http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/>