[AFS3-std] rxgk-afs: moving SetCallBackKey to a separate
document?
Benjamin Kaduk
kaduk@MIT.EDU
Sat, 2 Mar 2013 19:10:32 -0500 (EST)
On Sat, 2 Mar 2013, Simon Wilkinson wrote:
> On 2 Mar 2013, at 19:34, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> wrote:
>
>> On Sat, 2 Mar 2013, Simon Wilkinson wrote:
>>
>>> On 2 Mar 2013, at 18:30, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I'm in a similar position as jhutz; I think I understand what the callback protection mechanism should look like, and it doesn't involve protocol level changes outside of SetCallBackKey.
>>>
>>> When a server receives a SetCallbackKey RPC, which set of callbacks does that RPC apply to?
>>
>> The flip answer is of course "those from the same client" [over connections using the indicated security index].
>
> I'm mobile at the moment, which makes sending detailed answers tricky.
>
> Sadly just saying "from the same client" is insufficient, as is your
> later suggestion of just using UUIDs.
>
> The crux of the problem is that there isn't necessarily any trust
> relationship between the fileserver and the cache manager. Even if a
> trust relationship exists (via a KDC, say) there's no binding between
> the client's GSSAPI identity and its UUID.
>
> We need to create a mechanism which allows a combined token to
> authenticate such a cache manager to a fileserver, in a way that doesn't
> allow an attacker (which may include the user who is party to the
> combine tokens call) to collect any of the contents of callbacks, to
> forge callbacks, or to cause a state change that causes the client to
> silently lose all callbacks.
Clearly there is a lot of discussion left to be had about securing
callbacks. Are we at least confident that changes needed to secure
callbacks would be limited to the rxgk-afs integration document and that
the rxgk document will not need changes? You mentioned changes to
AFSCombineTokens, at least.
> As I have already noted, the text in the document doesn't represent my
> current thinking on SetCallbackKey. I'm pretty sure that the the reply I
> sent to Andrew's comments about it goes into much more detail than I can
> type here at present - it might be worth dragging that out of the
> archives.
I don't think anyone believes the current text of the document is fully
correct. I did get some useful pieces from your reply to Andrew's
comments when I was doing historical research; I suppose it's worth
reviewing that mail again.
> I'll try to go into more detail on Monday.
Thanks.
-Ben