OpenAFS Master Repository branch, openafs-stable-1_6_x, updated. openafs-stable-1_6_23-74-ge654f63

[Gerrit Code Review]

The following commit has been merged in the openafs-stable-1_6_x branch:
commit 6cbb7d9d57e5f7e0090b538c92b3eafe9c2656b0
Author: Mark Vitale <mvitale@sinenomine.net>
Date:   Fri Jul 6 03:21:26 2018 -0400

    OPENAFS-SA-2018-003 volser: prevent unbounded input to various AFSVol* RPCs
    
    Several AFSVol* RPCs are defined with an unbounded XDR "string" as
    input.
    
    RPCs with unbounded arrays as inputs are susceptible to remote
    denial-of-service (DOS) attacks.  A malicious client may submit an
    AFSVol* request with an arbitrarily large string, forcing the volserver
    to expend large amounts of network bandwidth, cpu cycles, and heap
    memory to unmarshal the input.
    
    Instead, give each input "string" an appropriate size.
    Volume names are inherently capped to 32 octets (including trailing NUL)
    by the protocol, but there is less clearly a hard limit on partition names.
    The Vol_PartitionInfo{,64} functions accept a partition name as input and
    also return a partition name in the output structure; the output values
    have wire-protocol limits, so larger values could not be retrieved by clients,
    but for denial-of-service purposes, a more generic PATH_MAX-like value seems
    appropriate.  We have several varying sources of such a limit in the tree, but
    pick 4k as the least-restrictive.
    
    [kaduk@mit.edu: use a larger limit for pathnames and expand on PATH_MAX in
    commit message]
    
    (cherry picked from commit 8b92d015ccdfcb70c7acfc38e330a0475a1fbe28)
    
    (cherry picked from commit fe41fa565be6e325da75f3e9b8fbdac2c521b027)
    
    (cherry picked from commit 39b675e243be70237ba9460b49b461c128aedffd)
    
    Change-Id: Idad0b0abf582b356042245398e1317a610ff321e

 src/volser/volint.xg |   12 ++++++------
 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

-- 
OpenAFS Master Repository