[OpenAFS] with or without krb5 and openldap?

Derek Atkins warlord@MIT.EDU
01 Aug 2003 11:32:15 -0400


Russ Allbery <rra@stanford.edu> writes:

> DNSSEC doesn't actually exist in a deployable form for real-world
> applications even according to the people who designed it, but that's
> another argument.

It's certainly deployable in an enterprise.  The problem is that it's
not deployable on a grand scale.  I can EASILY secure my own zone in a
way that *I* can use the security (e.g. I could secure my Hesiod zone(s)
and verify the security in my Hesiod clients).  The issue with DNSSec
is that it's difficult for *you* to verify my secured zone in a reasonable
manner.

IMHO those deficiencies are more targetted to normal DNS operations
rather than Hesiod-like operations.  For example, I suspect that MIT
could sign its own Hesiod maps and distribute the verification key to the
vast majority of the clients on MITNet in order to secure its own
Hesiod.

> Russ Allbery (rra@stanford.edu)             <http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/>

-derek

-- 
       Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
       Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board  (SIPB)
       URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/    PP-ASEL-IA     N1NWH
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