[OpenAFS] Kerberos V, users, passwd, shadow, alternatives
Kevin
openafs@gnosys.biz
Wed, 3 Mar 2004 11:26:06 -0500
Hi All-
I've posted a few questions in the last month or so and
thanks to those who replied, I'm now up and running
with a single AFS server running a SuSE 9 distro with
self-built version 1.2.11 of OpenAFS (SuSE 9 ships
with 1.2.10) that uses a self-built MIT Kerberos 5,
v1.3.1 (SuSE 9 ships with heimdal) system for
authentication. Thank you for the help!
While I'll admit to not having read all of the
documentation yet, I have read all of the conceptual
stuff, the QBG, and portions of the administrator's
reference and administrator's guide.
Naturally, I'm learning as I go and studying the docs
very carefully, but there's one issue that I'd like to
ask about because the docs I've read thus far don't
mention it: the Linux password shadow suite of
programs.
I searched the archive for this subject and saw a few
mentions of it, but none recently and none in much
depth (except in regards to NIS which I'm not using
and would prefer avoiding unless it makes alot of
sense to use it).
As would most people I guess, I'd like to have all AFS
user data (stuff found in /etc/passwd (login shell,
unix uid, unix gid, Name, home directory), /etc/shadow
(password and related data), the kerberos database
(principals and their privileges), openafs acls,
openafs uid, etc.) be centrally located, universally
accessible, and easy to maintain.
Based on the docs I've read thus far, I should be
making a common /etc/passwd file on AFS and merging it
with each client machine's /etc/passwd file whenever a
change is made to the AFS /etc/passwd file using cron
or something.
My question(s) is/are:
Is that still the best way to do this?
And what about /etc/shadow? Do I need to write a
script for shadow that is similar to that found in the
docs on merging the AFS /etc/passwd file with each
client machine's /etc/passwd file?
For my purposes, except for each client machine's root
account, I'd like to have all users be authenticated
from a single (perhaps replicated) source, and not
have any user accounts on each client machine's local
authentication source (no local users except
root---only Kerberos users for the network).
Or even, is there a way to make a "network superuser"
that would have root access to all client computers?
Or is that a bad idea? What do people do for the root
password on each client machine when there are
hundreds (or more) client machines? Make them all the
same? Keep a database of machines and their root
passwords handy? Just curious...
I'm sure someone else besides me has encountered this
issue. Care to share your ideas on the best way to do
this? I guess LDAP is an option, but I haven't done
much with that. What are others in similar
circumstances doing?
Oh, and as a final complication, what about throwing
windows machines into the fray? I maintain several
Samba PDCs and their associated networks, and that
seems to offer a pretty good (though not ideal) model.
Is it possible to do something similar with Kerberos
and OpenAFS. I know there is a way (with native
Windows code) to have the Windows box be a member of a
Kerberos Realm and have OS check an MIT Kerberos KDC
for login authentication, but it doesn't scale well
(requires changing each client machine's list of users
with every change in the network user list). Aside
from that, am I looking at a definite two-step login
process for windows machines authenticating against an
MIT kerberos database and accessing OpenAFS volumes?
Many thanks for any thoughts.
-Kevin